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H
art and Moore (HM) have 
returned to the primitive 
questions:  What is a 
contract?  Why do people write 
(long-term) contracts?  The classical 
view held by economists and lawyers 
is that a contract provides parties 
with a set of rights and obligations, 
and that these rights and obligations 
are useful, among other things, to 
encourage long-term investments.  
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an ex ante contract that pins down 
future outcomes very precisely, and 
that therefore leaves little room for 
disagreement and aggrievement.  
The drawback of such a contract 
is that it does not allow the parties 
to adjust the outcome to the state 
of the world.  HM study the trade-
off between rigidity and fl exibility.  
Their analysis provides a basis 
for long-term contracts that don’t 
specify details and throws light on 
why simple “employment” contracts 
can be optimal.
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HM provide an alternative, and 
complementary, view.  They argue 
that a contract provides a reference 
point for the parties’ trading 
relationship: more precisely for their 
feelings of entitlement.  HM develop 
a model in which a party’s ex post 
performance depends on whether 
the party gets what he is entitled to 
relative to the outcomes permitted 
by the contract.  A party who is 
shortchanged shades on performance, 
which causes a deadweight loss.  
One way the parties can reduce this 
deadweight loss is for them to write 
SIRE Focus Paper 1 outlines John Hardman Moore’s 
research with Nobu Kiyotaki on the macroeconomic 
questions to do with the nature of money and liquidity, 
and the interplay between the fi nancial system and the 
aggregate economy. 
In related research, Hart and Moore introduced what they believe is a new way of thinking about contracts.  Their 
idea is that, in an interesting class of cases, the role of a 
contract is to constrain or circumscribe what people bargain 
about later, rather than to specify a particular outcome or 
mechanism for determining that outcome.  To put it another 
way, a contract is an agreement to agree: an agreement to 
bargain about some things in the future, but not others.  
The advantage of thinking about a contract this way is that 
it allows HM to explain why parties restrict their choices, 
e.g., by taking money off the table.  The reason is that 
sometimes less is more: having less to bargain about ex 
post can increase ex ante effi ciency.  
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Hart and Moore have also written on the design of hierarchies.  Suppose that a decision must 
be made in an organization. The organization 
might represent a private fi rm, a public fi rm or 
even society. If two individuals clash over the 
decision, who gets his or her way?  In many cases, 
the answer is that it depends on who is senior in 
the organization.  That is, there is a hierarchy of 
individuals with respect to any decision. In the event 
of a confl ict, the decision will be taken by the most 
senior person in the hierarchy who cares about 
– or has a view about – this particular decision. 
In HM’s model of hierarchies, people have 
ideas about asset usage, but these ideas confl ict, 
i.e., only one person’s idea can be implemented 
with respect to any one asset. HM use their 
model to analyse the optimal hierarchical 
structure given that different agents have different 
tasks; in particular, some agents are engaged 
in coordination and others in specialization. 
Inter alia, their theory explains why coordinators 
should typically be senior to specialists, and 
why pyramidal hierarchies may be optimal. Their 
theory also throws light on the optimal degree of 
decentralization inside a fi rm and on the boundaries 
of the fi rm.
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